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Case Comment
evidence the declaration of a trust of land would not appear to be met
Neither does this factual situation fall within the categories of result-
ing trusts. This is not the case of the purchase and payment for land
by one person, title being taken in the name of another person.
Perhaps, therefore, the best explanation is that a constructive trust
was imposed to prevent an unjust enrichment, upon analogy to section
160 of the American Restatement of Restitution.' 2
There is a manifest difference between an action for remunera-
tion promised in consideration of an ilicit relationship and a suit for
property, the result of capital, industry, labour and economy. A
person in the position of this plaintiff should be entitled to half the
property where her capital and effort have so largely contributed
toward the end product. If law is to be an expression of social values
and to keep pace with the changing views of private and social inter-
ests, the decision of Milvain J., is to be preferred over the "strangers
in law" theory of the English Court of Appeal.
P. J. BRUNNER*
YOUNG V. YOUNG - DoMICiLE OF SERVICEMEN -AcQUISITION OF
DOMICILE OF CHOICE - DECLARATIONS OF INTENTION. Young v.
Young' is important as an example of the difficulty in attributing a
domicile to a person in certain fact situations. Although the rules for
determining domicile are simple and easily understood, great dfficulty
lies in their application to particular facts.
In this case the female petitioner sought a divorce on the ground
of her husband's adultery. The petition was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction in that the respondent, who did not defend this action,
was not domiciled in Manitoba. The respondent's domicile of origin
was Newfoundland. Evidence was given indicating that he enlisted
in the Army in order to get away permanently from that province.
He was stationed in Manitoba where he met the petitioner, married
her and lived with her only briefly after his discharge. The parties
soon separated and the respondent re-enlisted in the Army and has
since been posted to Alberta or Saskatchewan. There was evidence
that the respondent had said on several occasions that he intended to
settle down in Manitoba with his wife.
In the Court of Appeal, Adamson C.J.M. in an unfortunately
short, dissenting judgment felt that the respondent husband was domi-
ciled in Manitoba and would have granted the decree nisi. His Lord-
ship, after stating the facts, seemed to have no doubt that there was
a domicile of choice established in Manitoba relying, it appears, on
the marriage and residence in the province and the evidence of the
12 "160. Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equit-
able duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises."
ED. NoTo: Since this comment was written, many of the issues involved
have been dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in Thompson v.
Thompson, [1961] S.C.R. 3.
*Mr. Brunner is in the Second Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 (1960), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 616.
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declarations of intention of the respondent. The judgment of the
majority of the Court was delivered by Schultz J.A., Tritschler J.A.
concurring, who held that the respondent was not domiciled in Mani-
toba and as a result there was no jurisdiction to entertain the peti-
tion.
On a close reading of the case, it would appear that the Court
could have arrived at the opposite conclusion. The question of domi-
cile is elusive and depends on the facts in each particular case. This
may make it unsatisfactory as a requisite for conferring jurisdiction
on the Courts in divorce matters. Such an unsatisfactory criterion is
manifest by the hardship on the present petitioner, as well as many
others.
In his reasons for judgment, Schultz J.A. quoted from the judg-
ment of Duff C.J.C. in Trottier v. Rajotte,2 who said on the question
of change of domicile:
"Domicile of origin cannot be lost until a new domicile has been ac-
quired; that the process of the acquisition of a new domicile involves
two factors,-the acquisition of residence in fact in a new place with the
intention of permanently settling there: of remaining there, that Is to
say, as Lord Cairns says 'for the rest of his natural life', In the sense of
making that place his principal residence indefinitely".
Therefore, it is clear that one cannot extinguish a domicile of
origin. To acquire a domicile of choice in Manitoba, it must be shown
that the respondent acquired this domicile both animo et facto.
Although the respondent was in the Army most of the time that he
was in Manitoba, the fact of residence in that province can be proved,
in spite of Dicey's comment that, "A soldier does not, and in fact can-
not, acquire a domicile in the place where he is stationed".3 Lord
Normand in Sellars v. Sellars4 aptly qualifies this statement where
he says:
"Now, in my opinion, the requirement of residence is not satisfied merely
by proof of a residence imposed upon a soldier by the order of his mill.
tary superiors. But, then, there may co-exist with a residence, which has
begun and is continued under military orders, facts and circumstances
which establish a residence voluntary in character and chosen by the
soldier, although it is a residence in the place in which he Is stationed
by order of his military superiors".5
Similarly, in the Lauderdale Peerage Case6 where a British military
officer was stationed in New York for a period of eight years, Lord
Selborne L.C. said:
7
. . . "it is not necessary to say that a residence even under such cir-
cumstances, for several years in New York, might not possibly be suf-
ficient. if accompanied and explained by clear proof of an Intention to
settle there, sine animo revertendi".
2 [1940] S.C.R. 203 at p. 207; [1940) 1 D.L.R. 433 at p. 436, (S.C.C.
reversing Quebec Court of King's Bench, Appeal Side, 64 Que. K.B. 484).3 Dicey, Conflict of Laws 5th ed. 1932 at p. 131. However this view has
been abandoned in later editions.
4 [1942] Sess. C. 206.
5 Supra, at p. 211.
6 (1885), L.R. 10 A.C. 692.
7 Surra, at p. 739.
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The view of Lord Normand has been followed in Ontario in the case
of Wilton v. Wilton.8 In the case of Wilkinson v. Wilkinson,9 Boyd
McBride J. in an Alberta case held that a serviceman whose domi-
cile of origin was England could, in the circumstances of the case,
acquire a domicile of choice in Alberta while still in the Army. A
similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of British Columbia
in the case of McBeth v. McBeth.'0
Therefore, there is sufficient authority to show that a service-
man can acquire a domicile of choice where he is stationed.
The petitioner in attempting to prove domicile in Manitoba, in
the present case, relied on declarations of the respondent. There was
evidence that the respondent had said to the petitioner's father, when
courting the petitioner, that he intended to make his home in Mani-
toba. There was also evidence of conversations between the petitioner
and her husband to the same effect. Evidence given by the respondent's
brother showed that he had no intention of ever returning to New-
foundland and also that he wanted to stay in Winnipeg and settle
down there.
In dealing with the evidence of these declarations, Schultz J.A.
referred to the oft quoted passage from Lord Buckmaster's judg-
ment in Ross v. Ellison or Ross," where his Lordship said:12
"Declarations as to intention are rightly regarded in determining the
question of a change of domicile, but they must be examined by con-
sidering the person to whom, the purposes for which, and the circum-
stances in which they are made and they must further be fortified and
carried into effect by conduct and action consistent with the declared
intention".
Relying on the above quotation, Schultz J.A. felt that the declarations
were casual and did not manifest any serious thought on the part of
the respondent. His Lordship went on to say:' 3
"A mere declaration of intention, made under such circumstances as
existed when the respondent Young was courting his future wife, and
made to a prospective father-in-law, is not sufficient on which to find a
vital finding of fact".
This statement seems to suagest the unimportance of such declaration
in considering a question of domicile. However, such evidence, no
matter how seemingly unimportant, cannot be overlooked in consid-
ering the question of domicile. This view is well put by Kindersley
V.C., in Drevon v. Drevon, 4 where his Lordship said:
"There is no act, no circumstances in a man's life however trivial it may
be in itself, which ought to be left out of consideration in trying the
question whether there was an intention to change the domicile. A trivial
8 [1946] O.R. 117; [1946] O.W.N. 69; [1946] 2 D.L.R. 397.
9 [1949] 1 W.W.R. 249.
10 [1954] 1 D.L.R. 590.
11[1930] A.C. 1 (House of Lords (Sc.) affirming Scot. Sessions, [1926]
Sess. C. 1038.).
12 Ibid. at p. 6-7.
13 (1960), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 616 at page 621.
14 (1864), 34 L.J. Ch. 129 at page 133; 146 R.R. 589 at 596.
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act might possibly be of more weight with regard to determining the ques-
tion than an act which was of more importance to a man in his lifetime".
Furthermore, Schultz J.A. stressed the fact that the respondent had
no assets in Manitoba. Indeed, he had no assets anywhere. Does this
mean that if one has no assets in a jurisdiction, he cannot be domi-
ciled there?
With regard to the declarations as evidence of intention, it is
helpful to note the contrasting opinion of Adamson C.J.M. (dissenting)
who states concisely at p. 617;
"To his wife, her father and to his brother he stated on a number of
occasions that he intended to settle permanently in Manitoba and make
his home here. In my view this evidence proves domicile in Manitoba.
When discharged from the Army, the respondent took a job 6n Winni-
peg for a short time. However, he again enlisted and was moved to a
training establishment in Saskatchewan or Alberta. This fact does not
prove that he has abandoned his Manitoba domicile and established resi-
dence elsewhere".
It is submitted that this opinion of the case is to be preferred. It is
true that declarations of intention must be looked at very carefully as
directed by Lord Buckmaster in the Ross15 case. But the statements
of the respondent were not made at a time when they could be con-
sidered as self-serving. Although the evidence of the statements made
to the petitioner and her father could have been questioned by Schultz
J.A., the evidence of statements made to the respondent's brother are
not open to the same objection.16 These statements would tend to be
more truthful and indicative of the respondent's intention because, it
would seem, they would be made voluntarily and without purpose. In
any event, what motive or self-serving purpose would the respondent
have had in making these statements to his brother? Furthermore,
the fact that he made these statements declaring his intention before
there was a Us between the parties substantiates the sincerity and
validity of these declarations. The evidence given by the respondent's
brother would also have more weight than that given by the petitioner
who had an interest in the proceedings. Therefore, taking into account
the intention never to return to Newfoundland, the marriage of the
respondent and the residence of his brother in the same province,
coupled with the several statements of his intention, all these factors
go a great way in establishing a bona fide intention on the part of the
respondent to settle permanently in Manitoba.
In this context, the case of Donaldson v. Donaldson17 is of in-
terest. The respondent husband was an officer in the Royal Air Force
and was stationed in Florida. While stationed there, his wife divorced
25 Supra footnote 11.
16 It is to be noted that His Lordship did not deal with the evidence of
the respondent's brother.
17 [1949] P. 363; [1949] L.J.R. 762 (P.D.A.), followed in Stone v. Stone,
[1959] 1 All E.R. 194 (P.D.A.). Willmer J. in Cruickshank v. Cruiccshanl,
[1957] 1 All E.R. 889; 1 W.L.R. 564 agreed with the Donaldson decision
although coming to the conclusion that on the facts before him It had been
proved that the soldier had in fact intended to establish a domicile in the
country where he was posted.
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him in the Florida courts. He then married an American woman and
was posted back to England where his first wife brought an action for
divorce in England claiming that the Florida decree was void for want
of jurisdiction in that the respondent was not domiciled in Florida.
Ormerod J. on the evidence of the respondent husband held that at
the time of the Florida divorce the parties were domiciled in Florida
and hence the decree was valid. The petition for divorce in England by
the first wife was accordingly dismissed. The decision is interesting
because Ormerod 3. relied on the evidence of the respondent husband
alone, a person who had a great interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceedings and also, whose evidence was potentially self-serving if not
so in fact. The case also illustrates that one can acquire a domicile of
choice in a place where he is stationed without living there after being
discharged. Comparing the evidence in this case with that in the
Young case, it would seem that there would be sufficient evidence to
find a Manitoba domicile.
It might be added that the decision also creates an hardship on
the petitioner, who, if her husband retained his domicile of origin
in Newfoundland, can only obtain a divorce by way of a private Act of
Parliament.
D. N. SYNOWICKI*
* Mr. Synowicki is in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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